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The causes of pipeline failures can range from internal issues such as corrosion or 
material defects to outside forces (Yang, 2010; Yang and Mannan, 2010). Human error 
is a very sensitive topic because it involves the actions of an individual (Hill et al., 
2012). As one of the most challenging factors to be tracked down, human error factors 
are always related to many different areas, including engineering and psychology. To 
build a model to assess human error, engineers need to deal with many elements, such 
as identifying incorrect operation factors, defining the scope of the model, the 
methodology, designing, and data collection (Wu et al., 2015). 
Risk assessment methods should take into account all these factors in combination with 
each other. Therefore, it can be stated that available methodologies are not able to 
provide accurate results because of their inadequate ability to describe the variety of 
risks. Hence, it is important to develop a method that has the ability to quantify risk 
arising from the uncertainty of the pipeline failure due to human factors. In this work, 
Bayesian network approach is introduced to determine and predict risk associated with 
human interventions. 
A Bayesian network describes causal influence relations among variables via a directed 
acyclic graph. A probability is associated with each state of the node. This probability is 
defined, a priori for a root node and computed by inference for the others (Weber et al. 
2012).     Bayes’ theorem provides a means for making these probability calculations. 
Essentially, it is a relationship between conditional probability P(A| B)  and marginal 
probabilities (P(A) and P(B)) and is given for two events, as illustrated in Figure 1, can 
be expressed by Bayes’ Theorem: 
 





Figure 1: Basic example of a Bayesian Network 
 
 
2.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Figure 2 summarises the steps to develop a Bayesian Network risk assessment model. 






Figure 2: Flow diagram for risk assessment model 
 
2.1 Data collection 
The scope of risk analysis in this present paper is limited to corrosion damage. The goal 
of the proposed model was to estimate the probability of pipeline condition by taking 
into account the influence of human factors coming from various area. The areas are 
divided into three main categories for instance during maintenance, monitoring and 
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scenario were determined. Literature search or pipeline historical data due to corrosion 
is utilised throughout the understanding of the scenario.  
 
2.2 Development of Bayesian Network model 
The first step in constructing the BN is the development of the graphical representation 
to express the cause and effect relationships between the variables. This is important as 
it provides a straightforward means of analysing and communicating causal 
assumptions that are not easily expressed using standard mathematical notation. In this 
study, a commercial software package namely Hugin Expert was used to construct the 
BN model.Software Hugin Expert allows interactive creation of the network, 
maintenance of knowledge bases and integrates new evidence, efficient algorithm to 
support the implementation of Bayesian probability calculations, thus making a 
complete probabilistic model (Eleye-Datubo et al. 2006).  
 
2.3 Formulation of CPTs and prior probabilities 
The next step was to specify the possible states and define the conditional probability 
tables (CPTs) value. The data for prior probabilities and conditional probability tables 
were gathered from existing literatures. Prior to performing the analysis, the probability 
values in every column of CPTs were normalized to become 1. Probability values of the 
marginal and conditional were required to be nonzero in which each condition of CPT is 
in the range of 0 to 1. The information was collected from existing literatures for 
onshore pipeline incidents. 
 
2.4 Bayesian Network analyses 
Two types of analyses were carried out namely prediction analysis and diagnosis 
analysis. In the prediction analysis, the model will be updated whenever new knowledge 
or evidence is available. Meanwhile for the diagnostic analysis, the accidental path will 
be discovered and the posterior probability will be calculated. Based on the results 
obtained, a countermeasure to reduce the risk of the important factors were suggested in 
order to mitigate human errors. 
 
 
3.0RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Proposed Bayesian Network model 
The information was collected based on available literature. Referring to the available 
data in existing literature, the three main areas that human error can occur are during 
maintenance, monitoring and operation activities. The possible human errors for each 
category is summarised in Table 1. The developed Bayesian network the relationships 
of the potential human error at many points along the life cycle of a pipeline is shown in 
Figure 3. This life cycle provides an organization with the capability to integrate human 
factors into programs, standards, procedures, and process using a disciplined approach.  
In the category of maintenance error, the pipeline integrity condition usually being 
monitored and assessed by the determination of inspection frequency. Other than that, 
selection of the inspection tool used to evaluate the threat and tool capability were 
taking into account as these will effect on the inspection report. Operational error 
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category is commonly caused by individual or organisational errors.  Individual errors 
are those made by a particular person that contributes to an accident.The sources of 
organisational errors on the other hand, can be due to poor upper-level management and 
poor communication between the top level and the subordinates (Sulaiman, 2017). 
Finally monitoring errors, can also be observed with human-system interfaces such as 
equipment, software or instructions manual. These errors may eventually result in an 
















Figure 3: BN model of risk due to different errors.  
 
3.2 Prior probabilities generation 
The variables and states of activities on pipeline that will lead to error tabulated as in 
Table 1.  In this paper, the probability data were extracted from different literature 
sources rather than from a specific pipeline. These data sources were gathered base on 
the experience from different pipeline operators in order to generate the prior 
probabilities and conditional probability tables.  
 
Table 1: Parameters and the data sources for probability distributions. 
Parameter States Probability data sources 
Corrosion and rupture Yes, No Shan et al. (2017) 
Maintenance error Yes, No Adebayo et al. (2008) 
  Quality of data Good, Poor Adebayo et al. (2008) and Shan et al. (2017) 
  Management of threats Good, Poor Muhlbauer (2004) 
  Decision making Good, Poor Shan et al. (2017) and Muhlbauer (2004) 
  Design of inspection program Good, Poor Trucco et al. (2008) 
Monitoring error Yes, No Adebayo et al. (2008) 
  Emergency response training Good, Poor Adebayo et al. (2008) and Revie (2015) 
  Alarms prioritized Yes, No Hill et al. (2012) 
  Detect and direct field operators Good, Poor Muhlbauer (2004) 
Operation error Yes, No Adebayo et al. (2008) 
  Experience of operators Good, Poor Revie (2015) and  Shan et al. (2017) 
  Documentation management Good, Poor El-Abbasy et al. (2015) 
  Quality of communication Good, Poor El-Abbasy et al. (2015) and Revie (2015) 
  Response to change Good, Poor Adebayo et al. (2008), Hill et al. (2012) and Revie 
(2015) 
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3.3 Bayesian Network analyses  
The prior probabilities from the data sources listed in Table 1 were utilised to determine 
the probability of pipeline failure. The prediction of the pipeline failure is as depicted in 
Figure 4. From the results obtained, the highest error found was from operational 
activities contributing to 56%, which include experience of operators (65%), 
documentation management (47%), quality of communication (73%), and response to 
change (39%) are associated with pipeline failure.Operational errors occur when a 
system or process operates outside of or beyond the parameters of its design. For 
example, if specified operating practices call for a specific operating temperature, and a 




Figure 4: BN Model with Monitoring Window 
 
The second highest error of 55% contribution was from monitoring errors which consist 
of emergency response training (70%), alarms prioritized (19%), and direct field 
operators (83%) caused pipeline failure via corrosion and/or rupture of the pipeline 
system. Monitoring errors are said to occur when a problem is noticed, but no action is 
taken. Often, a worker may believe that someone else will take care of the problem, or 
that it's someone else's responsibility.  
Finally, maintenance error with 45% contributions which include quality of data (34%), 
management of threats (20%), decision making (60%), and design of inspection 
program (42%) will lead to pipeline failure. Maintenance errors occur when 
maintenance personnel fails to properly maintain or repair a system or improperly 
install one of its components. 
 
3.3.1 Diagnosis analysis 
The diagnostic analysis in Bayesian network inference was adopted to calculate the 
posterior probabilities of basic eventswhich can be used to find the weak links exist in 
the human error of oil and gas pipelines. The posterior probability distribution of each 
risk factor in case of an accident.  
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In this initialised situation, the nodes were characterised by their prior probabilities as 
presented in Figure 4. Suppose it observed that Pipeline Failure is in state Yes and 
P(Pipeline Failure =Yes)=1 was entered into the model. This entered evidence increase 
the belief in all of the possible causes based on diagnostic inference. This will result in 
57% probability due to maintenance, 66% due to monitoring and 68% due to operation 
errors.  Figure 5 shows the results of the revised posterior probability for each risk 
factor. It can be observed that the occurrence probability due to maintenance error, 
monitoring error and operational error increase to approximately 57%, 66% and 68% 
respectively.   
 
 
Figure 5: BN Model for Diagnosis Analysis  
 
Overall the most influence factors are from bad decision making and poor 
communication in the organisational. From the analysis, the practical fault diagnosis 
and checking should then focus on the probability of these suspected factors to control 
the risk of pipeline failure. Therefore, the posterior probabilities can provide new 
evidential information for fault diagnosis in real time. By performing this analysis, the 
posterior joint probability of all variables/parents given the accident occurrence are 
helpful for safety evaluation. 
 
3.3.2 Predictive analysis 
Evidence propagation was conducted to predict the probability distribution of the 
framework outcome and other relevant variables under the combination of changes in 
the assumption of certain variables. The aim of the analysis was to predict the 
probability distribution of the occurrence of pipeline failure factors before an accident 
occurs. In this section, the propagation of evidence examines several different scenarios 
and combinations of events taking place (i.e. 100% probability).  To check the proposed 
Bayesian network model, the percentage of human error in terms of bad response to 
change, no alarms prioritized and bad quality of data were considered. As a result, the 
probability of pipeline failure is increases up to approximately 65% as shown in Figure 
6. 





Figure 6: BN Model for Predictive Analysis 
 
According to Bayesian logic, the only method to measure a situation with an undefined 
outcome is through defining its probability. Bayes' theorem can provide a scientific 
method that could be used to calculate, given events in prior trials, the probability of a 
target occurrence in future trials. Hence this Bayesian model predictive-analysis is 
another example of Bayesian logic which can be used to predict future events for 
decision making. 
 
3.4 Counter measures for human error 
From the result obtained, some elements need to be considered in the development of 
human error management, plan and design include the following: 
 
3.4.1 Controlling human error in maintenance activities 
• Running a high quality in-line inspection (ILI) tool for the operation of the 
pipeline. A baseline ILI run could identify construction incidents that need 
investigation and decide what needs to be done.   
• Use of technology to automate repetitive processes that are prone to human 
error, such as data entry. Automation of some processes could eliminate the 
potential for copy/paste for human error. 
 
3.4.2 Controlling human error in monitoring activities 
• Use of expert judgment in rule-based analyses. For example, use of an expert 
system to evaluate ILI data could reduce the potential for judgment or detecting 
errors. 
• Training personnel on heuristics and biases for much more experience in 
unexpected situations. 




3.4.3 Controlling human error in operational activities 
• Training program for decision-making complexity to know how operators will 
communicate with each other for choosing the best way to handle the problems 
of the process. 
• Experience and knowledge transfer program can reduce human error during 
unfamiliar tasks, also in communicating for handling sudden changes. 
 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, a quantitative risk analysis approach due to human error for oil and gas 
pipelines is constructed using Bayesian network. The proposed model is constructed 
according to a cause and effect relationship. Two types of analysis were carried out to 
explore the advantage of the proposed approach. Through forward prediction analysis, 
the probability of pipeline failure occurrence can be calculated based on the evidence 
occurred. Meanwhile, through diagnostic analysis, the critical risk factors that may lead 
to failure occurrence were determined. From the results obtained, the proposed 
Bayesian network inference techniques can be applied to provide valuable 
understandings to the prevention of accidents and safety improvement. The counter 
measure could be suggested based on the results in order to reduce the risk of pipeline 
failure. In general, this work is mainly based on collection of different existing data 
sources and the accuracy of the pipeline failure prediction could be further improved 
with more relevant failure data. As Bayesian Network is able to integrate various type 
of data, expert judgment together with real data from a specific case study should be 
utilised for future works.   
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